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Organised crime and corruption in the UK: responding through law  
 
 
At one time “corruption by organised crime”1 was not regarded as a major issue in 
the UK. Now, however, it has growing salience in political discourse and policy 
formulation.2 It is recognised increasingly as an internal, albeit still uncommon, 
problem, as opposed to something that occurred overseas,3 or sporadically in 
relation to particular actors or sectors.4 Similarly, in the academic context, until 
recently5 exploration of the nexus between organised crime and corruption in 
Europe has been limited to certain jurisdictions,6 or certain types of crimes.7 And 
while discrete responses to both phenomena have been analysed from various 
disciplinary standpoints, less consideration has been given to the interface between 
the two and the extent to which the law is useful in addressing corruption by 
organised crime. This paper maps the available legal responses across the UK in an 
effort to determine the law’s coverage in preventing and reacting to “corruption by 
organised crime”.  
 The paper has three sections, focusing on the form of the problem, key 
definitions, and the law. First, I consider the forms that corruption by organised 
crime may take. Second, I explore the concepts of “organised crime” and 
“corruption”. Thirdly, and more specifically, I outline and assess the relevant legal 
measures, from substantive criminal offences to preventive regulations. In particular, 
I identify some points of contrast in Scotland when compared to the rest of the UK.   
 
1. The nature and scale of the problem  
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Generally (though one may contest the methodological approaches), the UK is 
regarded as experiencing low levels of corruption.8 Of course, a lack of evidence of 
corruption, and thus the relatively positive public perception, may be explained by 
factors such as under-reporting, a prevalence of low-level corruption that is not 
investigated, and poor scrutiny mechanisms.9 As Xenakis remarked in 2007, very 
little polling has been carried out in the UK on corruption; there are few court trials 
for corruption, and there is little public debate or discourse on corruption.10 The 
nature and the extent of discussion on corruption appear to be changing, but 
otherwise Xenakis’ observations hold true, especially in relation to corruption by 
organised crime. 
Practically speaking, corruption could aid the commission of organised crime 
in a variety of ways. One can envisage an organised crime group developing corrupt 
relationships to ensure the flow of information and to protect against state 
intervention.11 Moreover, corruption may guard against the group needing to resort 
to violence; and it ensures competitive advantage and thus facilitates the survival 
and growth of the criminal enterprise. Corruption could range from the corruption of 
personnel with access to data systems; officers involved in border control, policing, 
prisons and prosecution services; administrators of such institutions; managers in 
charge of procurement of goods and services; the judiciary, witnesses, and juries.  
Beyond the general empirical work on corruption, it is difficult to ascertain 
the extent to which organised crime groups (OCGs) are involved in corruptive 
behaviour in the UK. Though the NCA states that “the impact of corruption is 
disproportionate to the level and frequency at which it occurs”,12 this claim is hard to 
dispute, given the uncertainty of these terms, and the difficulty in quantifying the 
nature and degree of corruption. Nonetheless, it seems that organised crime does 
not exert a systematic influence over the UK’s legitimate economy and political 
system.13 There is no indication of organised criminals influencing elections, or of 
political alliances protecting such actors. Having said this, police corruption is not 
unheard of across the UK,14 and there is evidence of corruption of prison officers.15 
Moreover, it appears that some criminal groups have corrupted local business 
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structures.16 However, it is claimed that corruption of the judiciary is very rare, 
though corruption of prosecution administration and the jury has occurred.17  
 Official data do not indicate to what extent corruption is linked to organised 
crime. Looking to official statistics on recorded crime or prosecution for bribery, 
breaches of data protection, or to figures on public procurement, will not reveal the 
perpetrators or the purpose of the corruptive behaviour, which is critical in this 
context. In addition, no figures are retained centrally in the UK regarding public 
sector employees who were fired, suspended or prosecuted because of corruption 
or breach of data protection law regarding the access of information.18 Similarly, 
neither the Cabinet Office nor the Crown Commercial Service hold data regarding 
how many and which firms have been refused public contracts under procurement 
rules because of convictions for bribery and related matters, on the ground that it is 
a matter for individual contracting authorities to determine whether or not to 
exclude bidders on the grounds that they have been convicted of certain criminal 
offences including conspiracy, corruption, bribery and fraud.19   
Despite the empirical uncertainty, the interaction between organised crime 
and corruption is noted increasingly in UK policy. The Home Office describes 
corruption as a “widely used tactic” of organised crime,20 and as an important means 
of avoiding detection.21 Likewise, the National Crime Agency identifies corruption as 
a critical enabler of serious and organised crime,22 and the UK Anti-Corruption Plan 
refers to the threat of organised crime.23 In contrast, the Northern Ireland Organised 
Crime Task Force does not refer to corruption in its annual reports, though the 
predominant issue in the province is the interplay between organised crime and 
paramilitary groups.24 
  Indeed, the nexus between organised crime and corruption is recognised at 
the global level, with Gregory describing it as a “major preoccupation” of the EU and 
the UN.25 For example, the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime calls for the criminalisation of corruption and the adoption of 
measures to address it. Moreover, the Preamble to the UN Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) notes the concern of states parties “about the links between 
corruption and other forms of crime, in particular organised crime and economic 
crime, including money-laundering”. The correlation between corruption and money 
laundering is reiterated in documents and measures from European Union 
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institutions.26 The European Commission in its Communication on Fighting 
Corruption in the EU stated that corruption “causes social harm as organised crime 
groups use corruption to commit other serious crimes, such as trafficking in drugs 
and human beings.”27 And beyond the official governmental context, Transparency 
International regards corruption as organised crime’s “most powerful tool”.28 
 
2. Defining the issues   
Both “organised crime” and “corruption” are difficult to identify and define, and this 
complexity is compounded by their conjunction. There is no legislative definition of 
“corruption by organised crime” anywhere in the UK, and the only policy effort 
states: “in a serious and organised crime context corruption is defined as ‘the ability 
of an individual or group to pervert a process or function of an organisation to 
achieve a criminal goal’”.29 Thus it is useful to unpack the meaning of these 
constituent parts before considering the legal measures that can address the 
phenomenon. 
 
a. Corruption  
Corruption generally is understood as the abuse of public power for private profit or 
for a gain in power or status,30 though it is also less frequently regarded as the abuse 
of private power.31 Various models of corruption have been put forward.32 The 
orthodox view is that corruption compromises a duty and thereby offends against 
the relationship and loyalty between a principal and agent.33 This approach has been 
challenged by scholars such as Alldridge, reframing the issue as an offence against 
the market.34 The harm lies in the distortion of a market, not the corruption of a 
relationship.  
 Numerous forms of corruption exist, including: bribery of public officials, 
abuse of functions and power, and the use of office for personal gain.35 And like any 
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crime, corruption varies in terms of gravity, sophistication, impact and reach.36 
Moreover, conceptions of what is corrupt are temporally, culturally and 
jurisdictionally contingent.  
 No statutory definition of corruption exists in the UK. Despite its significance 
in the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption 
Acts 1906 and 1916, the term was not defined there. And as is elaborated upon 
below, the Bribery Act 2010 repealed and replaced these Acts but corruption 
remains undefined. The House of Lords described “corruptly” in the context of the 
Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854 as meaning “not ‘dishonestly,’ but in 
purposely doing an act which the law forbids as tending to corrupt”.37 That definition 
was adopted and followed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Smith in relation to 
the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889.38  
This paper’s understanding of corruption encompasses the abuse of power, 
be that public or private, for personal gain. Corruption here is both active and 
passive, in that it applies to the corruptor and the corrupted. Though this maps onto 
policy understandings, some may argue that an expansive approach dilutes the 
concept. I suggest that focussing on the abuse, rather than the source, of power, is 
correct. 
 
b. Organised crime  
Despite its prominence in political discourse, the term “organised crime” has no 
“agreed-upon definition”.39 Its meaning differs, between and within the academic, 
legal or political spheres. It may describe specific structures or organisations that are 
involved in criminality; the provision of illegal goods or services; or a certain type of 
crime that meets a given level of gravity.40  
 As yet, there is no statutory definition of organised crime anywhere in the 
UK. The Serious Crime Act 2015 criminalises participation in activities of an organised 
crime group, but the offence (which applies in England and Wales) centres on the 
notion of such a group, rather than organised crime itself.41 Section 45 provides that 
an OCG has as its/a purpose the carrying on of criminal activities, and comprises at 
least three persons acting together or agreeing to do so to further that purpose. 
“Criminal activities” are offences punishable with imprisonment for at least seven 
years, carried on in England or Wales, with a view to obtaining any gain or benefit. 
Strictly speaking, organised crime is not defined in Scotland – rather “serious 
organised crime” is. This is crime involving two or more persons acting together for 
the principal purpose of committing or conspiring to commit a serious offence or a 
series of such, where “serious offence” means an indictable offence committed with 
the intention of obtaining a material benefit, or an act or threat of violence made 
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with the intention of obtaining such benefit.42 There is no equivalent legislation in 
Northern Ireland. 
 Views differ as to the nexus between corruption and organised crime. Some 
see corruption as being a constituent part of organised crime; others regard it as 
practically useful. Some definitions of organised crime, such as that proposed by 
Maltz, refer explicitly to corruption;43 for others, organised crime’s continued 
existence is based on corruption of state personnel,44 and the sophistication of 
organised crime may be predicated on effective corruption. As Levi notes, highly 
organised crime is less likely to flourish in the absence of corrupt alliances between 
criminal justice officials, politicians and suppliers of illegal commodities,45 and it has 
been argued that the most successful criminal organisations make strategic use of 
violence and systematic use of corruption to weaken official oversight and law 
enforcement.46 Nonetheless, Van Duyne argues that organised crime-entrepreneurs 
engage in corrupt relations only if the risks (such as the sharing of information) are 
offset by expected advantages.47 So, although the two concepts and forms of crime 
are linked,48 there is scholarly divergence as to whether corruption is a necessary 
definitional aspect of organised crime, or, as is more likely, a valuable facilitating 
factor.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that the organised crime provisions in the Serious 
Crime Act 2015 or the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 do not 
mention corruption. Indeed, were legislative definitions of organised crime to refer 
to corruption this would make proving the offence more complex.  
 
 
3. Responding through law   
Now I turn to map the range of legal responses available in the UK, and to ascertain 
the value in the law preventing and reacting to corruption by organised crime. 
As Zimring and Johnson note, corruption differs from other crimes in terms of 
its social structure and distribution in society, given that it generally involves the act 
of someone with the means to bribe another or the power to provide a favour in 
                                                 
42
 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 28(3). 
43
 For Maltz, organised crime includes violence, corruption, continuity, and variety in the types of 
criminality engaged in: M Maltz, “On Defining ‘Organized Crime’: The Development of a Definition and 
a Typology” (1976) 22 Crime and Delinquency 338. 
44
 J Albanese “The Causes of Organized Crime: Do Criminals Organize Around Opportunities for Crime 
or Do Criminal Opportunities Create New Offenders?” (2000) 16 Journal of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice 409, 411. 
45
 M Levi, “Policing fraud and organised crime” in T Newburn (ed) Handbook of Policing (2nd ed) 
(Cullompton: Willan, 2008) 522. 
46
 International Narcotics Control Board, Annual Report, “Chapter One – Drugs and Corruption” (New 
York: United Nations, 2010) 3. 
47
 P Van Duyne “Organized crime, corruption and power” (1996) 26 Crime, Law and Social Change 
201, 205.  
48
 RT Naylor “Predators, parasites, of free-market pioneers: reflections on the nature and analysis of 
profit-driven crime” in M Beare (ed) Critical reflections on transnational organized crime, money 
laundering, and corruption (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 35; L Shelley “The unholy 
trinity: transnational crime, corruption, and terrorism” (2005) 11 Brown J World Aff 101-111. 
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return for a bribe.49 So corruption is hard to detect and prosecute due to the often 
high status of the offenders, the frequent lack of a direct victim, and the cooperative 
nature of the behaviour.50 In the specific context of corruption by organised crime, 
these issues are compounded as the power dynamic may be predicated on the 
threat of violence, and due to the group involvement. This may render many legal 
responses unworkable. Indeed, scepticism has been expressed about the ability of 
the law to address the issue adequately. It has been argued that law may exacerbate 
the problem, such as where too much regulation and excessive formalism generates 
corruption by encouraging people to circumvent the law.51 Nonetheless, I suggest 
this does not undermine the value of the law in all instances, but draws attention to 
potential unintended consequences. 
 Needless to say the creation and application of criminal law offences is just 
one aspect in deterring and reducing corruption: structural and cultural reforms and 
capacity building through education and public awareness campaigns are of 
significant value. Williams-Elegbe classifies possible reactions as administrative 
(involving executive discretion), regulatory (including criminal and civil laws) and 
social (stigma).52 My focus is on what Williams-Elegbe would class as regulatory, with 
the paper assessing the existing suite of legal mechanisms that address corruption by 
organised crime. Though this is not an exhaustive list, it provides an analysis of 
potentially relevant substantive offences and preventative measures. In a reactive 
sense, both the civil and criminal law may be relied upon. Licensing laws and 
procurement standards ostensibly seem the predominant preventive measures, 
though the criminal law may also act in terrorem, through measures which need 
never be invoked in practice. Overall the law is of use in both a substantive and 
symbolic sense, though key doctrinal gaps exist in the Scottish context.  
 
a. The criminal law  
A range of criminal law measures addresses corruption by OCGs, involving the abuse 
of office and illegitimate access to information, for instance.  
 
i. Inappropriate accessing of information  
Sensitive and protected information may be useful for an OCG, as it may include 
details of an intended victim, a witness or about an investigation, or it may be sold 
on for profit. Given the difficulty of surmounting sophisticated security systems, the 
corruption of “insiders” may be more straightforward and less resource-intensive for 
OCGs.53 This renders many people and positions in both the public and private sector 
vulnerable to advances from OCGs, ranging from clerks in the prosecution service, 
through police officers with access to secure databases, and operators in call centres.  
                                                 
49
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52
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53
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 Unauthorised access to or use of information systems constitutes a breach of 
s 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, which criminalises the knowing or reckless 
obtaining or disclosure or sale of personal data, and applies across the UK. Though 
such corrupt behaviour may be of considerable benefit to an OCG, conviction under s 
55 attracts a fine only, albeit an unlimited one. One implication of the absence of a 
custodial sentence is that breaches of s 55 are not recordable offences, and so no 
criminal record accrues. This makes the tracking of consecutive acts more difficult.   
 Numerous calls have been made for custodial sentences to be imposed in 
respect of the breach of s 55;54 this has not occurred, despite s 77 of the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 authorising the Secretary of State to alter this 
penalty. The rationale is that other cognate offences exist,55 such as unauthorised 
access to computer material and unauthorised access with intent to commit or 
facilitate commission of further offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and, 
as are explored below, misconduct in public office and bribery.   
 In addition, s 1(3) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 is relevant in respect of the 
corruption of public sector employees, making it an offence for a person who is or 
has been a Crown servant or government contractor to make, without lawful 
authority, a damaging disclosure of any information or document relating to security 
or intelligence which he possessed due to his position. Furthermore, s 4 states that a 
person who is or has been a Crown servant or government contractor is guilty of an 
offence if without lawful authority he discloses any information or document which 
is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position where the disclosure results 
or is likely to result in the commission of an offence; or facilitates an escape from 
legal custody impedes the prevention or detection of offences or the apprehension 
or prosecution of suspected offenders.  
 These provisions are used in response to corruption by organised crime, as 
well as more broadly. For instance, in 2014 an employee of the Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service was found guilty of breaching the Official Secrets Act 1989 
and the Data Protection Act 1998 by revealing to an accused person information on a 
number of court cases, including the details of witnesses.56 
 
ii. Misconduct in public office  
Corruption of a public servant by an OCG may result in her prosecution for 
misconduct in public office (MIPO) in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This is a 
common law offence, the gravity of which is exemplified by the fact that it is triable 
on indictment only and carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  
According to the Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 2003, this offence is 
committed when a public officer, acting as such, wilfully neglects to perform his duty 
and/or wilfully misconducts himself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of 
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 Home Affairs Committee, Private Investigators, Fourth Report of Session 2012-13 (HC 100) (London: 
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the public’s trust in him, without reasonable excuse or justification.57 This definition 
was described as “an improvement on the uncertainty that preceded it, but … still 
distinctly vague”.58 Furthermore, this is a conduct rather than a result crime, though 
it has been suggested that certain decisions of the CPS not to prosecute due to an 
absence of material damage imply that prosecution policy has imported this 
requirement.59 
 Needless to say, MIPO is an offence confined to those who are public office 
holders, viz. “an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which the public 
are interested, more clearly so if he is paid out of a fund provided by the public”.60 
This implies that the offence may not cover employees in private employment who 
carry out public functions. To be sure, the offence’s reach is becoming more 
significant in an era when more and more public functions are divested to private 
companies, such as prison security and transport to court. Indeed, the Court in 
Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 2004 noted that “This potential unfairness [as 
to who falls within its scope] adds weight, in our view, to the conclusion that the 
offence should be strictly confined but we do not propose to develop the point or to 
consider further the question of what, for present purposes, constitutes a public 
office.”61 
Misconduct in public office has been relied on against allegedly corrupt police 
officers and prosecutors that seek to benefit criminal associates. For instance, a 
number of years ago a CPS lawyer pleaded guilty to such a charge, inter alia, after 
having accepted a substantial payment to drop a case.62 In Attorney General’s 
Reference No 30 of 2010 the Court of Appeal increased to six years (from three) the 
period of imprisonment for a serving police officer who provided intelligence about 
on-going police operations to a drug dealer with connection to various OCGs over a 
five year period.63  
In contrast, there is no equivalent crime in Scotland. Gordon notes that it is a 
crime at common law for a public official, a person entrusted with an official 
situation of trust, wilfully to neglect his duty, even where no question of danger to 
the public or to any person is involved.64 Nonetheless, he stresses that common law 
prosecution against officials for breach of duty are almost unknown. One instance of 
this was Wilson v Smith where a police sergeant was charged with wilful neglect of 
her duty by failing to submit to the procurator fiscal reports relating to alleged 
offenders.65 The last reported case of breach of duty by a non-judicial official 
appears to be in the 19th century.66 The absence of a MIPO offence in Scotland is 
                                                 
57
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58
 JR Spencer, “Policemen behaving badly – The abuse of Misconduct in Office” [2010] 69 Camb LJ 423, 
425. 
59
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Law 179, 181-2. 
60
 R v Whitaker (1914) KB 1283, 1298. 
61
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62
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63
 [2010] EWCA Crim 2261. 
64
  G Gordon, Criminal Law (3rd ed) Vol. II [44.01], referring to Hume I 411. 
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notable in this context. Nonetheless, calls have been made for MIPO’s reform,67 and 
the Law Commission is beginning consultative work.68 So while the enactment of a 
comparable measure in Scotland would go some way to ensuring that corrupt acts 
do not fall between existing criminal provisions, concerns about the precise scope of 
the existing offence give us pause for thought.  
MIPO is supplemented by the newly enacted s 26 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 which makes it an offence for a police constable in England and 
Wales to exercise the powers and privileges of a constable improperly, where s/he 
knows or ought to know that the exercise is improper. This includes officers of the 
National Crime Agency who have the powers and privileges of a constable, including 
those operating in Scotland but not Northern Ireland. Improper exercise means 
exercising the powers for the purpose of benefiting herself, or for the benefit or a 
detriment for another person, and a reasonable person would not expect the power 
or privilege to be exercised for the purpose of achieving that benefit or detriment. 
This provision includes the failure to exercise a power and threatening to exercise or 
not falls. The rationale for this new provision was to supplement the “outdated 
common-law offence of misconduct in public office”.69  
Overall these offences may deter the potentially corrupted official, and 
provide a means of responding to corruption once it occurs. The corruptor, who in 
this context is acting for or as part of an OCG, may be guilty of aiding and abetting or 
conspiring to commit such offences.  
 
iii. Bribery  
A further critical piece of domestic legislation is the Bribery Act 2010, though of 
course this pertains to particular forms of corruption only. The concern in this paper 
is not just the corruption of state officials by OCGs, but also of private bodies, against 
which the Bribery Act is directed. The 2010 Act, which applies across the UK, 
provides for the offences of bribing another person70 (active bribery), being bribed71 
(passive bribery), and bribing foreign public officials.72 Bribing involves offering, 
promising or giving a financial or other advantage to another person, where the 
briber intends this to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or 
activity, or to reward a person for such improper performance, or where the briber 
knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute such 
improper performance.73 The Act also introduced the offence of failure of 
commercial organisations to prevent bribery of someone on her behalf.74 An 
organisation will have a defence if it can prove it has adequate procedures in place 
to prevent persons associated with it from bribing. 
 The Act applies to such actions in the UK and abroad, in the public and 
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private sectors. The replacement statutory offences do not differ greatly from their 
predecessors,75 except for extension of the offences to the private sector, a 
development that is questioned by Horder and Alldridge for overlooking the distinct 
moral significance in public sector wrongdoing.76 In response I argue that the abuse 
of private power for private gain warrants inclusion in understanding of and 
legislation on bribery. Though the Act covers all forms of bribery, there is a clear 
focus on commercial bribery, as noted in the Joint Prosecution Guidance of the 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions.77  
 The 2010 Act is perceived as being very strict, and as applicable in relation to 
a narrow range of corrupt practices only. Nonetheless, its presence may act as a 
deterrent “in terrorem” measure that need never be invoked in practice. Moreover, 
much of the controversy concerning the application of the Act is bypassed by the 
nature and illegitimacy of OCGs. For instance, the DPP in England and Wales or the 
Director of the SFO may enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with an 
organisation facing prosecution for an economic or financial offence including fraud 
and bribery,78 and as long as the terms are adhered to the prosecution is deferred. In 
Scotland, there is a “self-reporting” scheme permitting the reporting by 
organisations of conduct that may amount to an offence under the Bribery Act 
2010.79 These mechanisms are not uncontroversial, given the circumvention of 
prosecution.80 Nonetheless, they are not of relevance here; such agreements could 
not relate to an OCG, as such agreements would legitimate the entity and its 
existence. Moreover, though some OCGs are hierarchical with a relatively stable 
structure and board, most are not.   
 
b. Preventive measures 
In addition to targeting individual officials or power holders, OCGs may seek to 
“corrupt” processes of procurement and licensing, both to legitimise their enterprise 
and to generate profit. The sectors most susceptible include the public works and 
construction sector, property, legal and business services, and extractive 
industries.81 I next turn to consider preventive measures against potential corruption 
in public contracts and licensed businesses. 
  
i. Public procurement  
Public procurement, namely the state’s buying of goods and services from external 
suppliers, holds the potential to be corrupted, given the combination of high 
expenditure and the significant discretion of public officials. Furthermore, the 
complex nature of the public works and construction sector make it difficult to 
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monitor. Corruption schemes in public procurement range from bribes or “kickbacks” 
where the influencing public official gets a cut of the awarded contract; bid rigging 
(where the outcome of the tender is manipulated); the use of “front” or “shell” 
companies; to the misrepresentation of facts.82 A key concern is the granting of a 
contract to a company which is essentially an OCG, or which has connections to 
one.83   
Public procurement represents a large component of public expenditure in 
the EU,84 and so various directives seek to ensure transparency and non-
discrimination in the regulation of the single market. These directives, and their 
implementing regulations, are silent as regards potential criminal involvement in the 
process. Overall, though tangentially, such measures serve to prevent corruption in 
public contracts. Article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC required the exclusion from 
participation in a public contract of any candidate or tenderer who has been the 
subject of a conviction by final judgment for participation in a criminal organisation, 
corruption, fraud relating to the protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, and money laundering. 85 This definition is not unproblematic, given 
the jurisdictionally specific meaning of “final judgment”,86 and crucially, the 
obligations apply to contracts in excess of certain thresholds only. In addition, 
suspicion is not sufficient; rather there needs to be a conviction,87 and there is some 
debate as to whether convictions from beyond the EU are included.88 An equivalent 
scheme was established by Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors. These were implemented in domestic law in 2006.89  
Most recently, Directive 2014/24/EU repealed Directive 2004/18/EC to 
provide a simplified procurement regime. This was implemented in UK by the Public 
Contract Regulations 2015. Article 57 of the new Directive expands the list of 
qualifying offences to include people trafficking and terrorist financing. Crucially, 
there is no longer a total bar after conviction, rather the maximum period of 
exclusion is five years.90 Moreover, a means of “self-cleaning” is permitted by an 
economic operator who would otherwise be excluded, if it can show that measures 
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taken in mitigation are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability. It remains to be seen 
how these changes play out in practice.  
Disqualification from a public contract must be based on a conviction; in 
other words, tenders cannot be excluded if a prosecution is underway, or if other 
police data or intelligence exists.91 Williams-Elegbe identifies three rationales for the 
disqualification scheme: the policy rationale which demonstrates the government’s 
lack of tolerance of the issue in addition to the furthering of tax policies; a punitive 
rationale which punishes the excluded individual; and a protective one, which seeks 
to maintain the process’s integrity.92 All of these would validate extension to a non-
conviction based exclusion. I suggest that this should not be mooted, given the 
stigma involved and the compromising of legitimate business. However, the 
limitation of the exclusion to a mere five years after conviction seems too lenient 
and thus is problematic in a pragmatic sense.     
  These efforts to ensure transparent and legitimate competition may inhibit 
the efforts of small enterprises, and may in fact damage competition. Moreover, 
there is no evidence of any operator being excluded from a public contract because 
of a relevant conviction. Indeed, the reliance on self-declaration in which only the 
winner of the contract needs to produce certificates to back up what was said in 
tender is in tension with rigorous exclusion of convicted criminals from public 
contracts. So, the extent to which procurement rules address adequately risks of 
fraud and corruption has been rightly questioned.93  
 
ii. Licensing  
There is also considerable concern about the incursion of OCGs into legitimate 
business, through the provision of services like taxis and security, for example.94 This 
may be regarded as corruption of both business and licensing processes and may 
take the form of misrepresentation in attaining a license, corruption of members of 
the relevant boards, and corrupt practices with or for otherwise “legitimate” entities. 
This leads to unfairness in awarding of contracts, undermines fair competition, and 
ensures benefit for criminal actors. 
  The privatisation of security has been explored elsewhere.95 Suffice to say 
that one key issue in this respect is the incursion of dubious security actors, and the 
involvement of OCGs is particularly concerning, since it may facilitate further 
criminality like drug dealing or may be linked to extortion.96 While this is a specific, 
enduring problem in Northern Ireland due to the links between certain private 
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security providers and paramilitary groups,97 it has also been flagged up in 
Scotland.98  
 Efforts to address the corruption of security provision take the form of 
tightening of security licensing. Currently, the Security Industry Authority (SIA) 
operates a UK-wide scheme of compulsory licensing of individuals who undertake 
designated activities,99 such as security guarding and door supervision, key holding 
and vehicle immobilising.100 The licensing criteria are those the SIA considers 
appropriate for securing that the licensed persons are “fit and proper” to engage in 
such conduct,101 a concept to which I return later. In addition, the SIA operates a 
voluntary Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS) for private security suppliers.102 This is 
an accreditation scheme based on a set of operational and performance standards 
for suppliers. Notably, any contractor or sub-contractor performing security industry 
services under a Scottish Government contract or an NHS Scotland construction 
project is required to be registered with the ACS.103  
 Last year it was suggested that the UK would move towards a mandatory 
scheme of licensing of business, not just individuals,104 though this has yet to occur. 
Such a development has been described as “deregulatory” insofar as the objective 
would be to ensure reduction in cost and burden on the private security industry, a 
reduction in criminality and increased support for law enforcement partners, 
particularly those focused on disrupting serious and organised crime.105 I suggest 
that public contracts for security provision should be awarded only to those 
businesses that have been accredited under the ACS. Though this would entail a 
degree of bureaucracy, the level and nature of the public expenditure should 
necessitate the high standards of the scheme. A further proposal considered by the 
Scottish Serious Organised Crime Taskforce in 2014 was the introduction of anti-
mafia type certificates for businesses,106 akin to those that are required in Italy.107 
This could take the form of a self-declaration of non-involvement in serious 
organised crime, as occurs in relation to NHS procurement.108 Regardless, such 
certificates, with implications in terms of bureaucracy and rights of appeal, are not 
warranted in seeking to address this form of corruption by organised crime, and 
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indeed there is no equivalent development elsewhere in the UK. 
 Beyond the security context, licensing boards109 are significant in addressing 
corruption by organised crime in respect of acquiring licenses for venues, taxis and 
so on. Currently, a licensing board may look at “relevant” and “foreign” convictions 
when considering an application for licensed premises:110 relevant offences are 
those involving violence or dishonesty, although notably bribery is not included.111 A 
board can also consider whether granting the application would be consistent with 
the licensing objectives,112 including the prevention of crime and disorder and 
securing of public safety.113  
In this respect, the Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 permits 
licensing boards to consider more extensive range of information when making 
licensing decisions, on the basis that this would better address criminality. Section 43 
of the Act reintroduced the “fit and proper” test for alcohol licensing, which once 
had been in place under the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 (s 17) but was moved 
away from in the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005. Now a licensing board is able to 
consider information which “the chief constable considers may be relevant to 
consideration by the Board of the application”, and not just information deriving 
from criminal conviction. Moreover, s 52 removes the limitation which precludes a 
licensing boards from considering “spent” (under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
1974) relevant or foreign convictions when deciding on licence applications. This 
remains in place in England and Wales under s 114 of the Licensing Act 2003. 
 The rationale for the reintroduction of the fit and proper person test in 
Scotland is that it extends the material on which a licensing decision (most likely 
refusal) may be based. The concept is used in other contexts114 and so is not without 
precedent.  Conversely, it could be argued that the vague nature of this criterion is 
problematic by involving unfettered discretion. Moreover, in terms of efficacy it has 
been suggested in the context of waste disposal in Northern Ireland that the fit and 
proper person test is not sufficiently robust to screen out criminals.115 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
The current political focus on “corruption by organised crime” prompts some 
concerns. While the dominant narrative may be one of a worsening situation, 
empirically this is difficult to test, due to the definitional complexities and the nature 
of the problem itself. Nonetheless, reflecting on the scope of existing law is a 
worthwhile exercise, given the gravity and potential impact of this phenomenon.  
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Van Duyne has questioned the sense of a special policy against corruption by 
organised crime, on the basis that an anti-corruption policy should have a general 
impact.116 Similarly, I suggest that while the nature and gravity of corruption by 
organised crime may be cause for concern, it is not sufficiently distinct as to warrant 
a new and separate legal scheme. Instead, we must consider the substantive and 
symbolic value of our existing legal mechanisms, not least in an effort to attain some 
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